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Abstract 
When a firm encounters financial distress, there is a significant possibil-
ity that, at some point, the firm itself should be shut down and its assets 
put to a better use. But Chapter 11 and indeed all market-mimicking re-
organization regimes other than a speedy auction entrust the shutdown 
decision to a bankruptcy judge who lacks information and expertise, as 
well as the ability to control the timing of her decisions. Understanding 
the costs of entrusting the shutdown decision to a bankruptcy judge is 
central to assessing any law of corporate reorganizations. This paper 
models the shutdown decision as the exercise of a real option. The model 
suggests that the shutdown decision may loom so large in the early parts 
of the bankruptcy case that it erases any significant difference between 
Chapter 11 and many alternative market-mimicking regimes. All these 
regimes take more time than mandatory auctions and thus increase the 
cost of taking the shutdown decision away from a market actor. More-
over, the real option itself gives parties an incentive to withhold informa-
tion. Only a system of mandatory auctions both limits the amount of 
time the shutdown option resides with an inexpert decisionmaker and 
forces insiders to give that decisionmaker sufficient information to value 
the option while it is in her hands.  
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1. Introduction 
The difficult bankruptcy cases tend to be the ones in which the firm’s 
future as a going concern is uncertain. These firms—typically closely held 
businesses that do several millions of dollars of business a year—form only 
a fraction of the firms that enter reorganization, but these firms are the 
ones where differences in the legal rules governing reorganization matter 
the most. Large publicly traded firms survive as going concerns in the 
overwhelming majority of cases. The costs of Chapter 11 for large firms in 
financial distress seem on a par with the costs of other corporate control 
transactions.1 Alternative regimes might be less costly, but not dramatically 
so.2 At the other end of the spectrum are the small enterprises that have no 
future as going concerns.3 The reorganization process serves to wrap up 
the affairs of these firms. It is a “reorganization” in name only and lasts 
only as long as the relevant creditors want it to (Bufford, 1994).4 Whatever 
assets are not repossessed will be sold piecemeal. Alternative regimes will 
                                                     
1See Andrade and Kaplan (1998). Modern Chapter 11 practice for large pub-
licly traded firms is not the drawn-out affair commonplace in the early 1980s. The 
process is now centered in Delaware, where the bankruptcy judge behaves in 
much the same way as Chancellors that decide matters of corporate law. Invest-
ment bankers now oversee the drafting of the reorganization plan; they would also 
run the auction or implement an options-based recapitalization. It would be sur-
prising if the costs of these corporate control transactions were dramatically differ-
ent from others. 
2Proposals begin with outright support of mandatory auctions. See Baird 
(1986). They extend to market-mimicking mechanisms that use options (and other 
devices) that try to avoid some of the potential problems of a mandatory auction. 
See Bebchuk (1988); Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992); Rhodes-Kropf and Viswana-
than (2000). Others have pressed reforms that would let creditors and debtors 
choose contractually among forms of reorganization. Rasmussen (1992); Schwartz 
(1998).  
3More than half the firms in Chapter 11 have assets of less than $500,000. See 
Warren and Westbrook (1999:529) (giving figure of 58%). The overwhelming ma-
jority never leave Chapter 11 as going concerns. See Flynn (1989). 
4In many of these cases, the only creditor in the money is the IRS, which is 
owed FICA and withholding taxes. The owner-managers of the business are likely 
to be personally liable for these taxes. Chapter 11 provides a forum for IRS to work 
out a settlement with them. The role that the IRS plays in many small Chapter 11s 
makes inapt many of the conventional analyses of Chapter 11, based as they are on 
notions of the creditors’ bargain. In any event, the use of Chapter 11 to string out 
creditors and play for time so prevalent in the 1980s has changed in recent years 
with the increasing sophistication and professionalizaton of the bankruptcy bench. 
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bring about a piecemeal sale as well and will also largely be controlled by 
creditors.  
In the cases between these two ends of the spectrum, a firm’s chances 
of reorganizing successfully are less clear.5 Hence, the process used to re-
organize the firm—whether through a sale, an options mechanism, or a 
negotiated plan—matters. We do not want to destroy the value the firm 
has as a going concern, but we do not want to continue a losing venture 
when the assets are better used elsewhere. If the legal regime demands a 
swift mandatory auction of the assets and the firm is acquired by a single 
buyer, the shutdown decision is quickly put into the hands of a market ac-
tor who likely has both the appropriate skills and incentives. To the extent 
the reorganization takes time, however, the shutdown decision rests with a 
bankruptcy judge or some other actor who lacks both the expertise and the 
incentives needed to make this decision well. Entrusting the shutdown de-
cision to such a person can be costly, even if the reorganization lasts only a 
few months.6  
This paper explores the shutdown decision. Part I models the bank-
ruptcy decisionmaking as the exercise of one or more real options. Part II 
uses this model and recent empirical evidence to assess bankruptcy deci-
sionmaking in Chapter 11 and alternative regimes. We show that that the 
shutdown decision looms largest in the early part of the case. Alternatives 
to Chapter 11 that require some number of months to implement, such as 
Bebchuk (1988) or Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) may have few advan-
tages over Chapter 11.  
Part III contrasts mandatory auctions with Chapter 11 and alternative 
regimes. Mandatory auctions have their own costs. They give the bank-
                                                     
5As discussed in footnote 18, infra, our preliminary analysis of corporate 
Chapter 11 filings in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, reveals that 
the shutdown decision looms largest in cases between the two ends of the spec-
trum. Among the firms with debt between $500,000 and $10 million, half were shut 
down in Chapter 11. Most shutdown decisions take place within the first few 
months. 
6To give only one example, Merry-Go-Round was one of the most successful 
retailers of teen fashions during the 1980s. See Martin (1996). It fell on hard times 
during the 1990s and found itself in Chapter 11. Even then, however, the company 
still possessed a well-recognized brand name, employed thousands, and had more 
than $100 million in cash. Few creditors wanted to exercise the shutdown option. 
But a few months later (less than a year), the money was gone, as was most every-
thing else. Its principal asset was a cause of action against the management con-
sultants who had advised the firm during the bankruptcy. 
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ruptcy judge little discretion, and firms may be liquidated when no buyer 
appears who is willing to buy the firm as a going concern.7 The costs of 
mandatory auction depend on how often a buyer will not appear when the 
firm should be kept as a going concern. Whether a buyer appears, how-
ever, turns in large measure on how easy it is for potential buyers to learn 
about the firm. The cost of mandatory auctions might well be small if the 
prospect of the auction itself induces managers to make information about 
the firm’s value more accessible. 
2. Real Options and Bankruptcy Decisionmaking 
Whether in bankruptcy or out, the assets of a firm can be put to many 
different uses. Each departure from the original business plan abandons 
firm-specific investments. This problem is a species of what is known in the 
finance literature as an optimal stopping (or “real options”) problem.8 Out-
side bankruptcy, the firm’s owners decide whether to reconfigure the trou-
bled firm’s operations. In a reorganization regime, however, a judge makes 
this decision and how well it is made turns in large measure on the legal 
rule in place. 
2.1 A Simple Model 
When a firm files for reorganization, it triggers a mechanism designed 
to give it a new capital structure. When that process is complete, the shut-
down decision will once again reside in the hands of a market actor, but 
while the firm is being reorganized the bankruptcy judge must be prepared 
to shut it down if such a course maximizes the value of the assets. More 
formally, the firm files for reorganization at t=1 but it takes until t=3 to 
complete the reorganization. In the meantime, the bankruptcy judge (or 
other decisionmaker) will receive new information about the firm’s pros-
pects as a going concern. Using this information, the judge must decide at 
t=1 and t=2 whether to continue the reorganization efforts or to shut the 
                                                     
7In addition, a reorganization law that mandates speedy auctions is a “hard” 
regime in the sense that existing managers have relatively little bargaining power 
and may well lose their jobs. This will give managers incentives to delay filing a 
bankruptcy petition, an incentive that is less important under a “softer” regime 
such as Chapter 11. Thus, we need a mechanism that helps ensure auctions occur 
at the optimal time. See Baird (1991); Povel (1999). 
8For a general discussion of real options, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Real 
options analysis has begun to make its way into legal analysis, including Cornell 
(1990), Triantis and Triantis (1998), and Huang (1998).  
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firm down.9 If she exercises the “shutdown option” at t=1, we realize a 
fixed amount L,10 but we forgo the opportunity to learn whether the firm 
will be worth more than L next period. The news at t=2 could be good or 
bad. Let us assume that firm earnings at t=1 are certain (π1),11 while earn-
ings at t=2 will be either high (πh) or low (πl) with probability p and 1-p. Af-
ter t=2, the earnings of the firm are constant. Thus if the bankruptcy judge 
waits until t=2 to make the shutdown decision, we may find that the firm 
should remain intact, implying that the decisionmaker was wise not to ex-
ercise the shutdown option at t=1. Or we may find that the firm should 
have been shutdown from the very beginning. Waiting to obtain this in-
formation is costly. The firm’s shutdown value at t=2 will be L in nominal 
dollars, as it was at t=1. But time is money: there is a discount rate of 10% 
for each period. Thus the decisionmaker must balance the cost of waiting 
against the value of new information. 
To make things more concrete, assume that the piecemeal value of the 
assets (L) after the firm is shut down is $100, firm earnings are πh = 1.5π1 
and πl = .5π1, and the probability of high earnings (πh) is p = .5. If the firm 
receives high earnings at t=2, it will receive high earnings at t=3 and at all 
subsequent times. If we discount this future income stream, its present 
value at t=2 is 15π1. By contrast, if the firm generates low earnings at t=2, 
the discounted value of its future earnings for the rest of its life, measured 
at t=2, is 5π1. 
First consider the decisionmaking process at t=2, assuming the firm 
was not liquidated at t=1. The decisionmaker can either shut the firm down 
and realize $100 or she can keep the firm intact as a going concern forever. 
If the decisionmaker takes the latter course when earnings are low (πl), the 
present value of the future stream of earnings is worth 5π1. If this sum is 
less than $100 (that is, if π1 < 20), the decisionmaker will shut down the 
firm. In contrast, if the firm’s earnings turn out to be high (πh) at t=2, the 
decisionmaker will shut the firm down if π1 < 6.7, but not otherwise.  
                                                     
9In an Appendix (available on request), we show that the same results hold 
when the shutdown decision can be made continuously. This model draws on the 
framework in Dixit and Pindyck (1994:26-46). The model can be extended to cases 
in which the decisionmaker confronts a range of choices, rather than the stark 
choice between selling the assets piecemeal in a liquid market or continuing the 
assets in their current use. In all cases, the decisionmaking process turns crucially 
on recognizing that an option is embedded in each course of action. 
10We relax the assumption that L is fixed below.  
11These earnings are net of any expenses incurred during the period and ex-
clude any payments to creditors. 
6   Baird and Morrison   
 
The problem facing the decisionmaker at t=1 depends on the initial 
firm earnings π1. Suppose π1 = 8. We want to calculate the expected value of 
the firm if it remains a going concern indefinitely. We can predict that the 
firm will receive earnings of πh = $12 or πl = $4 at t=2 with equal probabil-
ity. Hence, from the perspective of a decisionmaker at t=1, the expected 
earnings at t=2, and all future dates, is $8. This expected earnings stream 
discounted to its present value at t=1 is $80. This amount (or “net present 
value”) is less than what the firm is worth if shut down at t=1 ($100). Thus, 
it might seem that the decisionmaker should shut the firm down. But this is 
wrong. We must also take into account the value of waiting for a period to 
find out whether the firm’s future earnings in all future periods will be 
high or low.  
Let us assume that the decisionmaker does not shut the firm down at 
t=1. What is the expected value of the firm to the creditors, bearing in mind 
that the decisionmaker has the power to shut the firm down at t=2? There 
is a 50% chance that earnings will be high and the firm will receive $12 at 
t=2 and in all subsequent periods. As we showed above, if earnings are 
high a decisionmaker will keep the firm intact if π1 > 6.7, which is clearly 
the case here. Hence, in the good state, $132 will be available to the credi-
tors at t=2. (The creditors enjoy the $12 earnings received at t=2 and the 
present value of the future income stream worth $120.) It is equally likely, 
however, that the firm’s earnings at t=2 will be low. The decisionmaker 
then must decide whether to shut the firm down. In the bad state, this deci-
sion is easy. We know a decisionmaker will shut the firm down if π1 < 20, 
which is the case here. Hence, in the bad state of the world, $104 is avail-
able at t=2 ($4 in earnings received at t=2 and $100 received from selling 
the assets). Thus, assuming the decisionmaker does not shut the firm down 
at t=1, the expected value of the firm at this date must reflect the equal pos-
sibilities of the good state (worth $132) or the bad state (worth $104) in the 
next period. The expected value of the firm is $118 at t=2 and (using a 10% 
discount rate) $107 at t=1. 
We want to compare the amount we can realize at t=1 by shutting the 
firm down immediately (or $100) with the expected present value of the 
firm if we delay shutdown until t=2 (or $107). When π1 = 8, the decision-
maker should wait until t=2 and should not liquidate at t=1. Even though 
at t=1 the break-up value of the firm is $100 and its expected value as a go-
ing concern is only $80, it should still be kept intact. If we focus only on the 
value of the firm if it remains as a going concern, we fail to take into ac-
count the benefits of waiting until we gather more information.  
More generally, we can characterize the value of the “shutdown op-
tion” in cases where the present value of firm earnings is less than its shut-
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down value. The value of the ability to postpone the shutdown decision 
until t=2 instead of having to make a once-and-for-all decision at t=1 is 
given by the difference between the expected value of the firm (dis-
counted) if the shutdown decision is made at t=2 and the liquidation value 
of the firm at t=1. Once we simplify, we learn that earnings in the first pe-
riod need to be only a little more than $7 for it to make sense to put off 
shutting down the firm. But at this level of earnings, the firm’s expected 
value as a going concern (ignoring the shutdown option available at future 
dates) is only $70, far below the liquidation value ($100). As this example 
shows, we may still want to keep the firm intact, at least for a short period, 
even when the expected income of the firm discounted to present value is 
less than the liquidation value. The ability to postpone the shutdown deci-
sion has value and should be factored into the calculation when deciding 
whether to shut down a firm.12  
Understanding the shutdown decision as a real option gives us some 
purchase on the problem the decisionmaker faces. The value of the option 
rises as the uncertainty about future earnings increases. The decisionmaker 
should be more patient—more willing to defer the shutdown option to the 
next period—when there is large uncertainty over firm earnings than when 
future earnings are more predictable. To return to our model, expected 
earnings of the firm turn only on the value of π1. We do not need to know 
the value of either πh or πl. In expectation, the firm will earn π1 in every pe-
riod. Increasing the spread between πh and πl has no effect on expected 
earnings. Such a change, however, does alter the value of the option. This 
in turn affects the shutdown decision. When πh = 1.5π1 and πl = .5π1, earn-
ings had to be over $7 to justifying keeping the firm open. When πh = 1.75π1 
and πl = .25π1, earnings have to be only a little more than $6.13 
We can understand the problem facing the decisionmaker more gener-
ally using (a now standard) framework from the real options literature. The 
variation in the earnings of the firm (dπt) at any moment in time can be 
modeled as  
dπt = µπt dt + σπt dWt 
                                                     
12This is another way of restating the familiar point that net present value 
(NPV) analysis in its simplest form is appropriate only if the decisionmaker must 
make a once-and-for-all decision. As soon as the decisionmaker has the ability to 
postpone a decision about how an asset is used, the net present value of a firm 
must take into account of option value inherent in delay.  
13This is shown in the Appendix (available on request). 
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This process can be used to determine the value of the shutdown option.14 
The process has two components. The first tells us how we expect earnings 
to change over time. We have so far assumed that earnings remained con-
stant after t=2. If the firm is recovering from economic distress, however, 
we would expect the earnings to improve over time. The predicted rate of 
growth of earnings is µ. The higher µ, the more valuable the firm as a going 
concern and the more valuable the shutdown option. 
Also crucial is the second component, σ, which measures the volatility 
(or variance) of future earnings. Although σ has no independent effect on 
the expected value of the future stream of earnings of the firm as a going 
concern, it does affect the value of being able to postpone the shutdown 
decision. As the volatility of firm earnings increases, the potential gain 
from waiting increases. If we can sell off the assets of the firm for L at any 
point in time, the increase in downside exposure from higher volatility is 
merely the lower earnings we receive before we shut the firm down, not 
the amount realized in the piecemeal sale. These low earnings in bad states 
do indeed become lower in each period as the variance increases. But the 
possibility of very low earnings for one period (after which the decision-
maker shuts down the firm and sells off the assets for L) is more than offset 
by the possibility of high earnings in all future periods when things turn 
out better than we expected.  
A decisionmaker needs to know how much can be realized by selling 
the assets (L); she also needs to know the current income the firm is gener-
ating (π1). But less recognized are the two additional elements that affect 
the value of the real option embedded in the shutdown decision: (1) the 
average growth (µ) of this earnings stream over time; and (2) the variance 
of earnings (σ) within any period of time. Current bankruptcy practice 
sometimes ignores these elements, especially σ.  
If a firm’s collateral is not depreciating in nominal dollars, modern 
bankruptcy judges are likely to focus on whether the debtor is satisfying 
postpetition obligations, not on the uncertainty associated with the firm’s 
income stream. Judges will not let a debtor go too long in the red postpeti-
tion, but they will allow the case to proceed months or even years if the 
debtor is at least breaking even. The case can remain in Chapter 11 as long 
as the debtor has some argument that it will be able to support a plan in 
                                                     
14This representation of the process is known as geometric Brownian motion 
with drift, where changes in the level of earnings are lognormally distributed. 
Again, this model of the information process is now standard. See Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994:59-132). 
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the near future and no adverse event gives a secured creditor or other in-
terested party an affirmative reason to protest. When the assets can gener-
ate more in an alternative use, however, we should continue the firm only 
if the shutdown option is sufficiently valuable. A necessary condition for it 
to have value is for there to be sufficient uncertainty about future earnings.  
In short, existing practice treats certainty in future earnings as a factor 
that militates in favor of keeping the firm intact rather than liquidating it. 
This is wrong. Other things being equal, certainty cuts in the opposite di-
rection. Lower variance has no effect on expected earnings, but the value of 
the option drops as the variance decreases. Armed with this information 
alone, a decisionmaker might well be able to make the shutdown decision 
once she had only modest and readily accessible knowledge about the firm. 
The hard cases arise when the volatility of firm earnings (σ) is high. 
2.2 Estimating the Growth Rate and Volatility of Earnings 
Both characteristics of the firm—µ and σ—will depend on industry- 
and firm-specific factors. When profitability of firms in a particular indus-
try grows slowly and is fairly predictable (µ and σ are relatively low), the 
value of the shutdown option is small. The decisionmaker does not raise 
the value of the firm by deferring the shutdown decision to a future date. 
The relevant information is at hand and the possibility that earnings will 
unexpectedly rise is low.  
The hard cases—those in which deferring the shutdown decision may 
bring the greatest gains—involve firms with highly volatile earnings (high 
σ). Long-term volatility, the climate in which the shutdown decision mat-
ters the most, can arise when there is wide-variation among similar firms 
in the same industry. From the perspective of the decisionmaker, the vari-
ance of earnings σ is quite high in these firms, even though the expected 
growth rate µ may be high or low. Greater uncertainty (σ) by itself in-
creases the value of the shutdown option. If the firm is generating a posi-
tive cash flow and the shutdown value of the assets is stable, delaying the 
shutdown decision merely postpones the time at which we realize L, the 
value of the firm’s assets when sold off piecemeal. This cost is worth bear-
ing when there is a possibility that the future income in every period may 
turn out to be large.15 
                                                     
15Although we characterize σ as a measure of the volatility, uncertainty, or 
“riskiness” of firm profits, we use these terms informally. Technically, σ is only a 
measure of the standard deviation of profits, i.e., the spread of outcomes around 
the expected (average) profit level. Thus, σ should not be confused with the typical 
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For any given firm, volatility is likely to decline over time. When a 
firm first enters bankruptcy, the decisionmaker has very little information 
about the firm and its prospects. The decisionmaker will not know the ex-
tent of the firm’s assets. The demand for the firm’s products is uncertain, as 
are its costs. The firm needs to make significant changes in its operations, 
perhaps because of mismanagement in the past. Similarly, mismanagement 
may make it hard for anyone to have a grasp on the firm’s prospects. Only 
time will tell whether efforts to clean house are successful.  
As the court receives more information about the firm’s assets or the 
ability of the firm to cut costs, it will gain a clearer picture of the firm’s 
prospects. Thus, we expect this component of variance to decline over time. 
However, total variance σ is unlikely to fall so far that the variance of prof-
its is insignificant. Uncertainty about the industry and about demand for 
the firm’s product—as well as uncertainty arising from factors not consid-
ered here—will remain relatively constant over time. Thus we expect σ to 
fall, but at a decreasing rate. In other words, there are diminishing returns 
to gathering information over time.  
Thus, the value of the shutdown option will generally decrease with 
time. Recall that the value of the shutdown option increases with the vari-
ance of profit. Hence, as the variance of profit decreases over time, the 
value of the shutdown option will also decrease. This implies that the earn-
ings π* one needs to justify delaying the shutdown decision increases over 
time. In other words, a decisionmaker should be less patient, more willing 
to make a once-and-for-all shutdown decision, as she learns more about the 
prospects of the firm (and therefore the variance of future earnings σ de-
clines). 
Empirically, the probability that a decisionmaker will shut the firm 
down should be low when the firm enters the recapitalization process: un-
certainty (σ) is large and the decisionmaker must gather additional infor-
mation before she knows whether to shut down the firm. The probability 
of shutdown, however, should rise dramatically as more information be-
comes available and the variance of earnings σ falls. The probability of 
shutdown should eventually decline. If the decisionmaker chooses not to 
shut the firm down within the first few months of the recapitalization 
process, she is unlikely to do so ever. Those firms that survived the deci-
sionmaker’s scrutiny during the early months should be the ones with the 
strongest prospects. 
                                                                                                                                      
measure of “riskiness”, beta (β), which measures the extent to which a particular 
asset contributes to the variance (or riskiness) of the market portfolio.  
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This is a form of “selection” effect: only the firms with the brightest fu-
tures survive the early period of judicial scrutiny. These are the firms that 
are most likely to remain as going concerns, so the probability of shut 
down will be quite low. In short, if bankruptcy judges make shutdown de-
cisions well, the probability of shutdown during the immediate postpeti-
tion period should be hump-shaped (that is, an upside-down U-shape that 
is skewed to the right). It should be low initially when little information is 
available, then rise substantially as the decisionmaker identifies the firms 
with no future, and then fall gradually as the remaining weak firms are 
weeded out and only the strong remain.16  
The task the judge faces is comparable to that faced by someone who 
wants to bid at an auction of a solvent firm. The entire process of gathering 
information and making it available to potential bidders takes about three 
months (Hansen and Thomas, 1998). To be sure, recordkeeping may be 
worse for firms in Chapter 11, and bankruptcy judges may be less adept at 
gathering it. But we do see auctions of insolvent firms in Sweden taking on 
average less than three months.17 Moreover, tools are available to judges 
that are not available to potential bidders at auctions. (At the start of the 
case, the managers of the debtor must identify the firm’s assets and earn-
ings and generally make themselves available for questioning under oath.) 
Firm conclusions require empirical study, but it seems reasonable to as-
sume that most of the shutdown decisions should happen within the first 
several months of the filing.18  
                                                     
16These implications of our model are identical to those arising from models 
of job search, where a real options model is frequently used to study the decisions 
of workers to enter and exit firms. A seminal paper in this area is Jovanovic (1979). 
Scholars have confirmed the empirical predictions of job search models and found 
that the probability (or “hazard rate”) that workers will exit a firm is “hump-
shaped” with respect to worker tenure. See, e.g., Lane and Parkin (1998). 
17In Sweden the average time from filing to the date firm assets are sold is 
about 2.4 months with a standard deviation of 3.4 months. See Thorburn (1999). 
Swedish law, however, does not permit the banks that are typically the largest 
creditors from bidding at these auctions. Thus, a mandatory auction regime should 
take even less time since anyone can bid. Unlike nonbankruptcy auctions of sol-
vent firms, the auction goes forward even if no one appears willing to buy the en-
tire firm. See Baird (1993). 
18Preliminary study reenforces this intuition. We collected data on all corpo-
rate Chapter 11 filings (138 in all) during 1998 in the Northern District of Illinois 
Bankruptcy Court, Eastern Division. From these filings, we selected the substantial 
firms (those with debts over $500,000) that were still operating businesses at the 
time the petition was filed. (We excluded both business that had already closed 
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2.3 Firm-Specific Investment 
Up to this point, we have made several assumptions, but none affect 
the general conclusions of our analysis.19 For example, we have assumed 
                                                                                                                                      
their doors and single-asset real estate ventures that had never been operating 
businesses in any meaningful sense.) This left us with 49 filings and 43 firms (there 
were 6 duplicate filings by sister firms with the same ownership and manage-
ment). We could gather data on 41 of the 43 firms.  
Identifying the date of shutdown (or the date of the firm leaves Chapter 11 in-
tact as a going concern) cannot be linked with a formal event in the history of the 
Chapter 11 case, such as the confirmation of the plan of reorganization, closing of 
the case, or conversion to Chapter 7. The assets of the business may be sold as a 
going concern quickly, but fighting among creditors may keep the case in Chapter 
11 for months (or even years) longer. Moreover, the case may end with a dismissal 
after the outstanding disputes are resolved. What seems by the standard bench-
marks to be a long-drawn out affair that ends in liquidation is a quick and success-
ful reorganization. Similarly, what seems a successful reorganization may, on ex-
amination, prove to be a Chapter 11 plan that calls for piecemeal liquidation of the 
assets.  
Hence a study that focuses only on such legal milestones as whether a plan 
was confirmed or not gives a wrong and misleading impression of whether the 
firm was shutdown or not. The only reliable way to identify the shutdown date or 
the date the firm leaves bankruptcy intact is to study the various filings in the case. 
These include the initial Chapter 11 petition and the disclosure statements, the pe-
riodic summaries of the firm’s revenues and expenses (which indicate whether the 
firm is in fact operating), and the various filings by creditors, the debtor, and the 
United States Trustee.  
Of the 41 substantial firms in our sample that entered Chapter 11 as operating 
businesses, 21 were shutdown in bankruptcy. The others left bankruptcy intact as 
going concerns—and most of these remain in business today. Our preliminary 
analysis suggests that the probability of shutdown over time is indeed “hump-
shaped.” A small number (2) of firms were shutdown within one month; the ma-
jority of firms that were closed were shut down between two to five months after 
filing (13); the remaining firms in our sample (6) were shut down one to two years 
after filing. These preliminary data are consistent with the hump-shaped distribu-
tion we would expect from judges who exercise the shutdown decision well. In the 
same sample, the probability of leaving peaked between seven and twelve months 
after filing among firms that left Chapter 11 intact. Few firms took less time or 
more. See Baird and Morrison (2001). 
19In addition to the assumption discussed in the text, we have assumed that 
the decisionmaker in bankruptcy has only two choices—a piecemeal liquidation or 
a reorganization. Sometimes a decisionmaker confronts a number of choices—
different reorganization plans, different plans for managing firm assets in bank-
ruptcy—each of which cannot be reversed or is reversible only at a significant cost. 
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that the value of the assets L in a piecemeal sale remains constant. But we 
can easily imagine cases in which the value L may rise or fall as a troubled 
firm continues operating. The shutdown value in any period might be cor-
related with earnings in that period. If earnings fall, L also falls. But when L 
falls, the change in the value of the shutdown option is not clear. Variation 
in L will reflect firm decisions that also change µ and σ. L may fall because 
the firm has taken decisions that increase the option’s value. 
For example, decline in the liquidation value L may be due to firm-
specific capital investments. Such investments, at least over the short term, 
reduce L—the value of the assets sold off after shut down. Firm-specific 
investments, by their nature, have value only if the firm continues as a go-
ing concern. On the other hand, these same investments should increase 
the value of the firm when it survives as a going concern. In terms of our 
model, it increases µ, the rate at which the earnings will grow. These in-
vestments also affect the value of σ. The effect on σ, however, is ambigu-
ous. Some investments may, for example, improve the reliability of the 
firm’s equipment and ensure that the firm can maintain a high level of 
output. Other investments, however, may have a high component of risk 
associated with them. These are the most interesting ones.  
All else constant, however, the more L decreases the earlier one should 
exercise the shutdown option.20 But the same riskiness that leads to a lower 
liquidation value also should lead to greater benefits from keeping the firm 
intact as a going concern. Investments that lower L may also raise the vola-
tility of earnings sufficiently that the value of the shutdown option in-
creases. Even assuming the decisionmaker is well-positioned to assess such 
a change in the firm’s operations, much turns on the relationship between 
the time at which firm-specific investments need to be made and the speed 
that we learn whether they will pay off. The shutdown option is most 
                                                                                                                                      
Each choice offers different combinations of expected earnings growth µ and vola-
tility σ. The wider set of choices does not change the basic nature of the problem, 
however. Indeed, the possibility of multiple options motivated the early, pioneer-
ing work in real options theory. See Weitzman (1979). The decisionmaker must 
rank the various alternatives and choose the one that brings the highest value, tak-
ing into account how the selection of one alternative will affect the value of the 
remaining options. For a discussion and application to job search, see Miller (1984). 
20If L is correlated with the firm’s earnings πt, the qualitative features of our 
analysis change, but the implications do not. The value of the shutdown option 
will still depend critically on µ and σ, but we also need to account for the strength 
of the correlation between L and πt. This type of problem is analyzed in Scheink-
man and Zariphopoulou (1998). 
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likely to be valuable where the initial firm-specific investments are small 
and where σ declines quickly. Waiting is least attractive when the invest-
ments come early and information about their efficacy comes later. 
3. The Costs of Complex Reorganization Regimes 
Bankruptcy judges are imperfect substitutes for market actors. Market 
actors have their own money on the line and this makes them intensely in-
terested in making good decisions. Moreover, there is a natural sorting 
mechanism as only those market actors who make good decisions survive. 
There is no similar competitive process or sorting mechanism for bank-
ruptcy judges. They are subject to reappointment only every 14 years and 
making the shutdown decision is a small part of their docket. Moreover, 
the people who make the reappointment decision (other federal judges) are 
not themselves well-positioned to assess the bankruptcy judge’s perform-
ance. 
In addition, once the Chapter 11 case starts, the judge must stand at a 
distance. Section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code forbids the bankruptcy judge 
from attending the meetings at which the managers of the firm must turn 
over information to the creditors. Rules of judicial conduct limit the ability 
of the bankruptcy judge to gather information informally. She cannot even 
talk with any of the players outside the presence of the others, nor can she 
conduct her own investigations. Indeed, she typically is empowered to act 
only when one of the players files a motion. 
For these (and other) reasons, one might well conclude that the bank-
ruptcy judge is ill-equipped to make the shutdown decision. But before the 
firm is again in the hands of someone whose own money is on the line, 
there may not be better alternatives. It is hard to create a mechanism in 
which the person who makes the shutdown decision in bankruptcy also 
has a financial incentive to make the right decision. One might require the 
bankruptcy judge to hire investment bankers and others to do the job and 
structure their compensation in a way that gives them an incentive to make 
the decision well. It may, however, be no easier to find such a person and 
negotiate their compensation than to find a buyer of the assets. In any 
event, it may be as hard for the bankruptcy judge to oversee someone else 
making the shutdown decision as it is to make the shutdown decision her-
self. 
The costs of entrusting the shutdown decision to a nonmarket actor ex-
ist both in Chapter 11 and in every reorganization regime that takes a sig-
nificant amount of time. As we observed in the last part, most of the shut-
down decisions should be made within the first few months after the filing 
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of the petition. If the bankruptcy judge makes the shutdown decision 
well—and we find preliminary empirical evidence that this is the case21—
then Chapter 11 as now practiced may not be significantly different from 
the more complex alternatives. Modern Chapter 11s may not last longer 
than the Bebchuk (1988) or Aghion, Hart & Moore (1992) regimes.22 Even if 
it does, the empirical evidence suggests that firms in reorganization run 
their day-to-day operations at the plant level as well as firms outside of 
Chapter 11 (See Maksimovic and Phillips, 1998). More importantly, most of 
the firms that should not survive have already been shut down before any 
of these processes are over.23 Hence, if bankruptcy decisionmaking can be 
done well, there may be few costs of Chapter 11 over alternative complex 
regimes. 
Now consider the possibility that the bankruptcy judge does not make 
the shutdown decision well. Firms that ought to be shut down linger 
longer in Chapter 11 than under alternative regimes to the extent that 
Chapter 11 takes more time. By the same account, however, these alterna-
tive regimes are worse than mandatory auctions. Here lies the challenge 
facing anyone who promotes complicated mechanisms such as Bebchuk 
(1988) and Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992). If the bankruptcy judge can 
make shutdown decisions well, Chapter 11 may not seem particularly 
more costly. And if the bankruptcy judge cannot make them effectively, 
these procedures seem distinctly worse than mandatory auctions, at least 
over this dimension. 
The reliance Chapter 11 and alternative complex regimes place upon 
effective bankruptcy decisionmaking suggests that we reassess mandatory 
auctions. When no buyer of all the assets bids at the auction, the firm will 
be shut down and its assets sold piecemeal, even if it is worth keeping in-
tact as a going concern. While the shutdown decision might be made too 
late in the other regimes, it may happen too soon in a regime of mandatory 
auctions. Whether and when a buyer appears, however, is not independent 
of the legal regime itself. In the next part of the paper, we turn to the ques-
                                                     
21See footnote 18, supra. 
22For example, while four months is needed to implement Aghion, Hart and 
Moore (1992) in every case, the typical pre-packaged Chapter 11 takes only two or 
three. See Tashjian et al. (1996:142) (reporting a mean of 3.3 months and a median 
of 2.1 months).  
23Our preliminary study of the shutdown decision suggests that bankruptcy 
judges can and do make the shutdown decision within a few months of the filing. 
See footnote 16, supra. The fate of the firm is effectively decided before the proce-
dure of Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) can be implemented. 
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tion of how the choice of the legal regime itself affects the amount of in-
formation that will be available to potential buyers. 
4. Auctions and Information-Forcing Rules 
The nature of the bankruptcy regime itself will affect the amount of in-
formation about µ and σ that is available to the judge. Specifically, the more 
a regime ties a judge’s hands and forces her to make a once-and-for-all 
shutdown decision, the greater the incentive parties will have to make sure 
information is available at that moment. This information forcing effect—
reducing uncertainty about the firm’s future—may offset (or more than 
offset) the cost of being forced to make a decision too soon. 
Under existing law, the bankruptcy judge’s role in a reorganization is 
passive. The bankruptcy judge’s window on the case is largely limited to 
the discrete issues that parties bring before her in open court. If the shut-
down decision is not made at the very start of the case, the bankruptcy 
judge might not have the chance to shut the firm down for weeks or 
months. Over the years, bankruptcy judges have mitigated this deficit by 
calling status hearings on their own motion. Congress added explicit statu-
tory authority for this practice in 1994 when it added §105(d) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code. These and other provisions, however, fall short of giving the 
bankruptcy judge the ability to monitor the case continuously. This con-
straint on her decisionmaking tends to bring about more premature shut-
downs than we would see if bankruptcy judge had greater control over the 
administration of the case. We get worse decisions when we put artificial 
constraints on the decisionmaker. The distortion here—premature shut-
downs—has the greatest effect on those firms for which the real option is 
the most valuable. These are the firms most likely to benefit from waiting.24  
A mandatory auction regime is effectively one in which the shutdown 
decision is made at the outset of the case if no buyer for the assets appears. 
Hence, everything else being equal, such a regime neglects even more of 
the option value of keeping the firm intact than a regime that gives the 
bankruptcy judge little discretion. But all else is not equal. Each bank-
ruptcy regime—and the restraints it imposes on judicial decisionmaking—
will affect the amount of information that comes to the bankruptcy judge 
                                                     
24These again are the cases in which variance in earnings is the greatest. A 
formal proof is contained in the Appendix (available on request). Triantis (1996) 
points out this weakness in U.S. law in his comparative study of Canadian bank-
ruptcy laws, which empower bankruptcy judges to “screen” firms while they are 
being reorganized.  
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and how quickly it comes. The value of the real option is itself endogenous 
to the choice of bankruptcy regime. In a mandatory auction regime, man-
agers of firms that have value as going concerns will do everything they 
can to make this information readily available at the start of the case. They 
will keep their jobs only if a single buyer of the assets can be found and the 
chances of finding such a buyer go up the more such information is avail-
able.  
By contrast, when a bankruptcy regime takes time and judges are re-
quired to make the shutdown decision as well as they can, insiders have an 
incentive to withhold information. The less information that is available at 
the start of the case, the greater the returns to waiting before shutting down 
the firm. Even after the firm has entered Chapter 11, insiders have an in-
centive to engage in behavior that increases the decisionmaker’s uncer-
tainty about the firm’s future. Making information hard to find, investing 
in high-variance projects, and engaging in other activities that raise σ in-
crease the value of the shutdown option and hence induces the decision-
maker to wait. For this reason, there is an offsetting benefit in a speedy 
auction regime to limiting the ability of the decisionmaker to account for 
the value of the shutdown option. 
A regime of mandatory auctions is strongly information-forcing. It 
gives managers (and everyone else with an incentive to preserve the firm 
as a going concern) an incentive to make information available and verifi-
able to potential buyers. Such a rule destroys the option value associated 
with keeping the firm running for a short time (assuming no buyer is will-
ing to purchase the firm in toto at the outset), but it gives the managers an 
incentive to ensure that a market for the firm’s assets always exists. Less 
traumatic checks on the bankruptcy judge’s ability to exercise the shut-
down option bring similar costs and benefits on a smaller scale. Hence, if 
one is committed to a complex bankruptcy regime, whether Chapter 11 or 
one of the alternatives, one must be cautious about reforms that allow the 
bankruptcy judge too much control over the course of the proceedings. 
One can also try to create a mechanism that forces parties to come 
forward with information. Such is the Canadian system. The bankruptcy 
judges of Canada have broad powers to force insiders to reveal information 
about a firm’s future potential (Triantis, 1996). When a firm applies for 
bankruptcy protection under Canadian law, the judge will force the debtor 
to explain why the firm fell into financial difficulties and to show why the 
going-concern value of the firm exceeds its shutdown value. The judge will 
dismiss a bankruptcy case if she is not convinced by the debtor’s explana-
tion. Additionally, Canadian bankruptcy judges will regularly appoint a 
“monitor” or trustee to collect information about the debtor firm and re-
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port this to the court and interested parties. The trustee, for example, must 
submit a report attesting to the reasonableness of the debtor’s projected 
cash-flow statement. If the statement is misleading, the trustee may be li-
able to outsiders who rely on the statement. 
The Canadian bankruptcy judge enjoys broader powers to compel in-
siders to reveal private information. The information gathering mecha-
nism, however, might not be as effective as the one built into a mandatory 
auction regime. Instead of relying upon administrators to extract informa-
tion from an adversarial process, the auction creates a set of incentives that 
produces the same result. The parties who control the information (the 
managers who lose their jobs if the firm is sold off piecemeal) have an in-
centive to gather it and disclose it. If there is a mandatory auction and the 
information is not at hand that would convince someone to buy the firm as 
a going concern, one might infer that such information does not exist. The 
process is, of course, an imperfect one, but it may be better than alternative 
regimes in which information had to be gathered in an adversarial process 
and the absence of information gave decisionmakers a reason to wait. 
There are, to be sure, costs25 to a regime of speedy and mandatory auc-
tions, particularly a risk that no buyer may appear and the firm is sold 
piecemeal.26 Indeed, these are precisely the costs that motivate alternative 
regimes such as those set out in Bebchuk (1988) and Aghion, Hart and 
Moore (1992). They assume that speedy sales are too likely to lead to a 
piecemeal sale of the firm. But complex reorganization mechanisms bring 
their own costs, even if they take advantage of market-mimicking mecha-
nisms. These regimes commit the shutdown decision to a nonmarket actor, 
                                                     
25These include the costs of designing the auction itself. Recent work argues 
that the design has important incentive effects and is best left to ex-ante contract-
ing. Bhattacharyya and Singh (1999). 
26And the firm may not be sold to the highest valuing bidder, as that person 
may be liquidity constrained. See Shleifer and Vishny (1992). The importance of 
liquidity constrants, however, is unclear. Even when the old managers face such 
constraints, they are not necessarily frozen out even in an auction regime as a ma-
jor creditor may be willing to lend managers money to “buy back” the firm. 
Strömberg (2000) finds evidence of such buy backs after mandatory auctions in 
Sweden, although he notes that this procedure can create bad incentives on the 
part of managers and the creditor who finances the managers. An alternative 
method for avoiding liquidity constraints is the noncash auction (which is similar 
to a buy back). But recent research shows that such auctions are quite complex (if 
done properly) and can create their own set of bad incentives. See Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2000). 
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who lacks expertise, lacks incentives, and is unable to act continuously. 
Moreover, this decisionmaker must operate in a world in which many of 
the participants have incentives to keep information hidden. 
5. Conclusion 
In any bankruptcy regime some decisionmaker (perhaps a judge) must 
be given the task of making decisions that are, as a practical matter, irre-
versible. This decision involves the exercise of a real option. The value of 
this option depends in large part on the reorganization regime in place. 
Seen from this perspective, the debate about corporate reorganizations 
takes on quite a different character. Instead of a debate about the benefits 
and costs of Chapter 11 versus a number of different mechanisms that use 
markets, we have a debate that focuses on the complexity and the duration 
of the bankruptcy process. From this perspective, Chapter 11 and what 
seem like radical reforms, such as Aghion, Hart & Moore (1992), are much 
more like each other than either is like a mandatory auction regime. All of 
these relatively complicated regimes share the common problem that they 
entrust the shutdown option to a nonmarket actor for a significant period 
and at the same time increase its importance. Chapter 11 and alternative 
market-mimicking reforms give insiders insufficient incentive to share cru-
cial information with the judge or other decisionmaker. Only a system of 
mandatory auctions both limits the amount of time an inexpert decision-
maker handles the shutdown option and forces insiders to give that deci-
sionmaker sufficient information to exercise the option well while it is in 
her hands. Understanding the shutdown decision as the exercise of a real 
option provides new reasons for being skeptical about the virtues of both 
Chapter 11 and complex, market-mimicking alternatives to it. 
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